Current Agenda August 14, 2006 Two major change of events occurred in a fortnight’s period: Israel entered Lebanon and the Special Combat section scored a clear dominance within the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF-TSK). While the Middle East war spread, the US firmly “integrated” the rulers of Turkey to its strategic interests. […]
Current Agenda
August 14, 2006
Two major change of events occurred in a fortnight’s period: Israel entered Lebanon and the Special Combat section scored a clear dominance within the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF-TSK).
While the Middle East war spread, the US firmly “integrated” the rulers of Turkey to its strategic interests. The US achieved a serious success in being able to gather a coalition, with the exception of Iran, through which it will control the entire oil and natural gas flows in the region. The oil pipeline of Baku-Ceyhan-Haifa became the backbone of this coalition. The local partners in this coalition are Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkey, while the big bosses remain as the USA, England and Israel. The much mentioned “Common Vision” among them is nothing but the security vision of this partnership. Nobody should have any doubt that Israel’s attack against Lebanon is only a part of this security vision. That is, the Turkish rulers have no “uncertainty of choice” as they had on March 1st . The US held firm and engaged the rulers of Turkey to this process by applying comprehensive stick-and-carrot operations at each of the economic, political and military arenas.
The announcement of the Turkish prime minister, Erdoğan on the second day of the attack that Turkey “could participate in an international force” was evidence that the ruling, Justice Development Party (JDP-AKP) was ready to take its place to be the “imam” alongside the “executioner.” Yet the US and Israel demand much more than a simple prayer. They demand Turkey to also take responsibility in the occupation of Lebanon for Israel.
The decisions regarding the appointment of the General Staff in the Turkish Armed Forces came during the days when the rulers of Turkey were also facing radical strategic choices. While Gen. Büyükanıt was selected to be the Chief of Staff, the General Staff was formed from a powerful team which had passed through the NATO’s intelligence units, had gathered “international expertise,” and was from the Special Combat operations. As a result, in order to transform this “common vision” with the US into a daily action plan, an able body with “full authority” was created. The deal this new team has agreed with the US involves the US’ support for an acceptable time frame against the public scrutiny either from the EU or international observers during the tough conditions which will arise in Turkey when it will wipe PKK from Northern Iraq and will crush them within Turkey’s borders.
US’ promise is to limit the PKK in Northern Iraq. In the first steps of what has been revealed in the press as the “Elimination of PKK Plan,” the Kurdish administration closed down two PKK offices in Northern Iraq. Recently, the news of capturing and sending some PKK leaders to Turkey filled the newspapers. Ramazan Toptaş, a prominent PKK leader was murdered in a “civilian” attack in Northern Iraq. In the process of elimination or containment of the PKK camp in the Qandil mountain the Turkish state is seen as targeting to make Northern Iraq a non-safe region for the PKK. On the other hand, the talks of an amnesty for the Kurds started to appear in the press either implicitly or explicitly.
Recently, Turkey had already amassed 250,000 troops to the Iraqi border. The conditions to bring an Emergency Rule had been created. Then the Anti-Terror laws passed. Recent days the operations and arrests in the Southeast region of the country intensified. The Kurdish daily Özgür Gündem and the Kurdish weekly Özgür Halk were closed down. At the same time violence against the revolutionary opposition started to escalate. PKK’s defense against all these developments was to intensify the guerilla actions.
Together with the events listed above, it seems like the new order being established for the ruling of the state indicate that the conflict between the JDP-AKP government and the army will be limited only by a shared strong pro US foundation.
The first action of the new General Staff was to prevent the news of a new “hooding” incident against a Turkish major by the US soldiers in the İncirlik US Air Force Base from spreading. To prevent an accident in its relationship with the US, the General Staff showed its sensitivity in the matter and immediately stepped in and announced that the Turkish major was wrong in the incident. In short, it seems like those who await the “nationalist tendencies” in the new “hawkish” command in the army will be making a terrible mistake.
The next stage in this struggle will be the process of election of the new president. The General Staff will aim to increase its power to intervene in the internal affairs and will push for a de facto environment for an Emergency Rule. Secondly, they will demand that the new president elect should both preserve the internal balances and also be agreeable with the “common vision” with the US. These two policies of the Turkish army means that the manipulations that keep the Kurdish question at the top of the plans will be the top priority agenda items in the days to come. It is also understood that the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP-AKP) has taken a step backward in the face of the pressures it received.
The JDP has also created a growing disappointment in its support base. The agricultural policies that led to the recent revolts among hazelnut growers, the destruction it caused in health care, the stagnation of the wages while inflation soared to double of what was expected, and the actual social collapse due to elimination of the public sector is resulting in JDP-AKP to lose all its credit among the Turkish-Sunni working classes.
Due to these social reactions, while a right wing see-saw is being re-established, the ruling classes started to polish the DYP (The True Path Party) for its future role. The ruling JDP-AKP party has started talking about necessary changes in the way representatives are elected and lowering the required qualification limit in a party’s votes to be represented in the Assembly to scatter the reaction votes it feels will rise.
However, there are events that point to the opposite direction to the JDP’s growing fray. The conspiracies of the authoritarian nationalists are creating a reaction among the people. Although the JDP-AKP has not kept any of its promises, the lack of real opposition is partly responsible for this reaction. On the other hand, partly because of the Islamic resistance, the social reaction, which grew against the US and Israeli massacres, is inclined towards the political Islam in Turkey and the JDP-AKP is benefiting from this trend.
The deficiency is in the left. The “left” political centers in Turkey are unable to develop left policies. The left spectrum includes those who are defined as “Liberal left”, “Militarist Left” or “Nationalist Left,” which should never be classified as being in the left in the first place. All these so-called leftists continuously get worn out and are weakened by producing policies that follow either the pro US moderate Islamists like the liberal left, or by following the CIA left over armed-radical Islamists like the militarist left, or by following the army and its appendages like the nationalist leftists.
Everywhere in the world the reaction against the USA/Israel barbarism and the neo-liberal destruction policies are being organized by the left. Even when a left trend is growing in the Middle East, having the Islamists control these reactions and having the left be satisfied with some insufficient attempts; when the peasant revolts turn to left all over the world having these turn towards the rightist parties in Turkey; when everywhere in the world the oppressed peoples’ movements raise the struggle against imperialism, having the Kurdish national movement expect a helping hand from imperialism are the peculiarities of Turkey.
The chaos in
our region is pushing the Turkish socialist movement towards forming new lines. To be a revolutionary these days in nothing if not to produce concrete policies to make the social reactions of the oppressed classes meet with the left and to carry these out in real life.
The coming year or year and a half will be a period that is firmly determined by the list of consecutive elections stacked one after the other for the rulers. All sectors of the rulers are planning their near future plans based on the next year and a half. They are contended with only preparatory or initial efforts in this period for the extremely radical changes expected in the mid or the long range future. They are waiting for the elections period to be over for their extensive plans. The revolutionaries should also form their near future programs based on this concrete reality.
Under the conditions presented above, an independent left position could be developed on the following four basic themes in the coming months which will be pregnant with a conflict between the pro US reactionarism and the pro US authoritarian nationalism,
1. Rapidly develop an anti-imperialist line around the axis of resistance against the war and against sending Turkish troops to Lebanon.
2. Bring together the opposition against the destruction of the public sector and the opposition against the impoverishment of the people with positive rights struggle such as, “the right to a free and quality education,” “the right to free health care,” “right to housing,” and “right to transportation.”
3. Build an anti-racist struggle that strives for a democratic solution of the Kurdish question.
4. Raise the struggle for democracy under the expected tough conditions.
Based on these four themes, a mid-ranged program must be rapidly developed, and in the direction of this program an all out door-to-door, person-to-person, street-to-street mobilization must be started.
This article first appeared in the People’s Voice (Halkin Sesi) paper #9.